Exemplar theory was motivated by research that often used D. L. Medin and M. M. Schaffer's (1978) 5/4 stimulus set. The exemplar model has seemed to fit categorization data from this stimulus set better than a prototype model can. Moreover, the exemplar model alone predicts a qualitative aspect of performance that participants sometimes show. In 2 experiments, the authors reexamined these findings. In both experiments, a prototype model fit participants' performance profiles better than an exemplar model did when comparable prototype and exemplar models were used. Moreover, even when participants showed the qualitative aspect of performance, the exemplar model explained it by making implausible assumptions about human attention and effort in categorization tasks. An independent assay of participants' attentional strategies suggested that the description the exemplar model offers in such cases is incorrect. A review of 30 uses of the 5/4 stimulus set in the literature reinforces this suggestion.
Humans' categorization processes are a central topic in cognitive psychology. One prominent theory-prototype theory-assumes that categories are represented by a central tendency that is abstracted from a person's experience with a category's exemplars (Homa, Rhoads, & Chambliss, 1979; Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith & Minda, 1998) . Prototype theory assumes that a stimulus is compared with the stored prototypes and placed into the category with the most similar prototype. Another prominent theory-exemplar theory-assumes that categories are represented by specific, stored exemplars instead of abstracted prototypes. It assumes that a to-be-categorized item is placed into the category with the most similar stored exemplar traces (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981; Nosofsky, 1986 Nosofsky, , 1992 .
Many of the studies that encouraged exemplar theory featured a category set that contained five Category A training exemplars and four Category B training exemplars (Table 1) . This 5/4 category set originated with Medin and Schaffer (1978) in an article that introduced the exemplar-based context model and dominated the early papers that supported exemplar theory (Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984; Medin, Dewey, & Murphy, 1983; Medin & Smith, 1981) . It was a crucial component of Nosofsky's (1992) critique of prototype models and of various explorations of exemplar models (Nosofsky, Kruschke, & McKinley, 1992; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995) .
Two results from the 5/4 category set, one quantitative and one qualitative, have emerged as support for exemplar models. The quantitative result is that exemplar models often fit performance profiles better than prototype models do (Nosofsky, 1992; . For example, Figure 1A shows the composite performance profile from 30 5/4 data sets together with the composite of the 30 best-fitting profiles when an additive prototype model was fit to each data set . The prototype model fits relatively poorly because it underpredicts observed performance on the nine old, training items (Stimuli 1 to 9). Figure  1B shows that a standard exemplar model (the context model) fits the observed data better.
The qualitative result concerns the differential predictions of the prototype and exemplar models regarding how people will learn two stimuli in this category set. The prototype model predicts that participants will learn Stimulus A1 (1 1 1 0) better than A2 (1 0 1 0) because A1 is a more prototypical Category A exemplar: it shares more features with the category prototype (1 1 1 1) than A2 does. (Stimulus A2 shares features equally with both prototypes.) The exemplar model predicts that participants will learn A2 better than A1 because of the assumption that to-be-classified items are compared with all of the training exemplars in both categories. Stimulus A2 (1 0 1 0) is highly similar (three features shared) to two other Category A exemplars (A1-1 1 1 0; A3-1 0 1 1) and no Category B exemplars. If participants make exemplar-to-exemplar comparisons, A2 will be a strong Category A exemplar. Stimulus A1 (1 1 1 0) is similar to only one other Category A exemplar (A2-1 0 1 0) but two Category B exemplars (B6 -1 1 0 0; B7-0 1 1 0). If participants make exemplar-to-exemplar comparisons, A1 will be a weak Category A exemplar and will be miscategorized into Category B. Figure 2 illustrates the predictions of both models and shows that the exemplar model generally predicts an A2 advantage. In some cases, participants have shown the pattern predicted by exemplar theory (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Medin & Smith, 1981; Medin et al., 1984; Nosofsky et al., 1992) . This has been seen as strong support for exemplar theory because the exemplar model is not just quantitatively better at fitting data, but qualitatively correct in predicting the character of data.
Reasons for Caution
Given the critical role the 5/4 category set has played in supporting exemplar theory, it is important to consider the results it yields and to be certain that all of the assumptions of exemplar theory are justified regarding this category set. There are several reasons to be cautious at this point.
Concerns About the Quantitative Result
First, in most of the articles that featured the 5/4 category set, models were fit to aggregated performance profiles, not to the performance profiles of individual participants. However, Ashby, Maddox, and Lee (1994) and Maddox (1999) argued that aggregating data can change its seeming psychological character so that the wrong model is favored over another model. Smith and Minda (1998) showed that aggregating data produces performance profiles that exemplar models fit best for technical reasons that do not relate to the psychology of individual participants. In fact, Smith, Murray, and Minda (1997) demonstrated that aggregating data can average away individual prototype-based performance.
Second, some of the original articles that featured the 5/4 category set compared an additive prototype model with a multiplicative exemplar model (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Medin & Smith, 1981; Medin et al., 1983) . That is, the similarity between the item and the category representations was a linearly decreasing function of psychological distance for the prototype model but an exponentially decreasing function of psychological distance for the exemplar model. The idea that similarity in psychological space is best described by an exponential-decay function (Shepard, 1987) was incorporated into exemplar models by Medin and Nosofsky (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) . However, comparing the additive prototype model to the multiplicative exemplar model places the prototype model at a disadvantage in fitting data because its additive similarity calculations are less sensitive. That is, they produce a more constrained performance space. The additive prototype model may perform poorly not because participants rely on exemplar-based processes instead of prototype-based processes but because the additive prototype model is less flexible. Minda and Smith (2001) compared balanced prototype and exemplar models and found considerable support for the prototype model (see Myung & Pitt, 1997 , for further discussion of model complexity and flexibility).
Third, showed that the exemplar model fits the existing 5/4 data sets better partly because it can reproduce the practice effect for old items that were presented many times during training. Figure 1 shows that both models fit the transfer items well , but that only the exemplar model fit the training items well. showed that a number of models, even prototype models, can describe the 5/4 The composite observed performance profile produced by averaging 30 existing 5/4 performance profiles (see Smith & Minda, 2000, for details) . In all cases, these data were collected from a postlearning transfer phase. Also shown is the average of the best-fitting predicted performance profiles found when the 30 profiles were fit individually using the additive prototype model. Panel B: The same observed profile shown with the composite predicted profile of the exemplar model. data equally well if they are granted the capacity to reproduce this practice effect. Thus, the quantitative fit advantage of exemplar models does not point strongly toward the processing assumptions of exemplar theory but only toward the more neutral claim of improved performance with practice and repetition.
Concerns About the Qualitative Result
The apparent equivalence of exemplar and prototype theories in explaining the 5/4 data makes the A2 over A1 advantage even more important to exemplar theory. This result might qualitatively favor exemplar theory's processing assumptions. However, there are also concerns about this qualitative result. First, whereas some of the 5/4 data sets showed an A2 advantage, other data sets showed the opposite result. suggested that the A1-A2 results might reflect random scatter around equivalent A1-A2 performance, and they suggested why equivalent performance might be the expected outcome.
Second, showed that the A2 advantage did not even emerge overall across the 5/4 data sets. Performance on Stimuli A1 and A2 was statistically equivalent. Figure 1 shows this equivalent performance on A1 and A2. also considered separately the 12 data sets that were produced under conditions that should have been most ideal for fostering exemplar processing and still performance on Stimuli A1 and A2 was statistically equivalent. Commenting on , Nosofsky (2000) found that the result was present if one excluded 20 data sets and analyzed the 10 that he argued were most suitable for evaluating exemplar theory. The need for this exclusion and its rationale was also discussed by Smith and Minda (2001) . However, noted that A2 advantages will occur occasionally, and they stressed the need for further research that could assess the importance of this result, the conditions of its occurrence, and its implications for exemplar theory.
Third, suggested that the exemplar model, to reproduce A2 advantages when they occur, seemed to adjust its attentional weights in a way that real participants might not. In particular, in fitting the data sets with an A2 advantage, the exemplar model estimated that participants focused substantial attention on the second dimension of the stimulus set. But this dimension is only 55% diagnostic of category membership (i.e., focusing on that dimension allows one to categorize only five of nine training exemplars correctly). Participants would be more likely to ignore Dimension 2 than attend to it because it carries almost no useful category information.
Motivations for the Present Research
Clearly more research is needed to evaluate the A2 advantage, to investigate the seriousness of the cautions just outlined, and to clarify the theoretical situation regarding 5/4 data and exemplar theory. The present research approaches this clarification from several perspectives. We address the problem of aggregate data by fitting models to individual participants' data. We address the problem of incomparable models by using a multiplicative prototype model that is comparable to the exemplar model in formal complexity and in the similarity metrics and computations it uses. Finally, we used independent measures of attention to explore suggestion that the exemplar model estimates implausible attentional strategies as it fits A2 advantages. For example, we examine the correlation between participants' performance and the featural values (0 or 1) that the stimuli contain in any one dimension. If participants strongly attend to one dimension, they should make Category A choices when that dimension takes on its typical A value, and they should make Category B choices when that dimension takes on its typical B value. Measures like these have been used before in category research (Kemler Nelson, 1984; Smith & Shapiro, 1989; Smith, Tracy, & Murray, 1993; Ward & Scott, 1987) . This model-free attentional measure can then be compared with the attentional descriptions offered by different category models. Of course these analyses will be most meaningful if our experimental conditions happen to be among those that promote strong A2 advantages in at least some of our participants.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 evaluated the performance of participants in a category set that was formally identical to the 5/4 category set adopted by Medin and Schaffer (1978) and others. We analyzed performance with a multiplicative exemplar model and a multiplicative prototype model; however, we also examined the fit of the additive prototype model to allow comparisons with previous research. Finally, we assessed each participant's attentional allocation across dimensions in a way that was independent from the estimates of the dimensional weights made by the different models. In this way, we hoped to judge the appropriateness of the attentional descriptions the models offered as they fit performance.
Method
Participants. Sixteen undergraduates from the State University of New York at Buffalo participated to fulfill a course requirement. The data of one Figure 2 . The figure shows the general predictions of prototype and exemplar models regarding performance on Stimuli A1 and A2. To produce this simulation, we first took 16 random configurations of the standard prototype model's weight parameters and sensitivity parameter and found their predicted performance on Stimuli A1 and A2. These were averaged to create one simulated sample of prototype-based processors. We created 3,000 of these random samples (with n ϭ 16) and plotted the average A1-A2 performance of each as light gray dots. Similarly, we found the average A1-A2 performances of 3,000 random samples (n ϭ 16) of the standard exemplar model and plotted these as dark gray dots. participant was dropped because that participant failed to perform better than chance at any point during the experiment.
Stimuli. The stimuli were line-drawn bug-like creatures, shown facing left. Figure 3 shows an example. These bug stimuli were piloted by Smith and Minda (1998) and Minda and Smith (2001) with the goal of making the four stimulus dimensions about equally salient.
Category set. Table 2 shows the category set used in Experiment 1. It was chosen randomly from among the small group of category sets that are perfectly isomorphic to the category set of Medin and Schaffer (1978) and shown in Table 1 . For present purposes, the stimuli were derived from the nominal category prototypes 0 0 0 0 and 1 1 1 1 for Category A and B, respectively. Given that reversal of prototypes, one sees that Medin and Schaffer's Dimensions 1, 2, 3, and 4 correspond exactly to our Dimensions 4, 3, 2, and 1.
Across categories, the four dimensions (features) were .66 .77, .55, and .77 predictive of category membership. No dimension was perfectly diagnostic or criterial, though all four carried at least minimal information. The third dimension did carry minimal information and could only correctly categorize five of nine training exemplars. An adaptive participant would probably learn to ignore this confusing stimulus dimension and allocate more attention to Dimension 1 (with .66 predictiveness) and especially to Dimensions 2 and 4 (both with .77 predictiveness).
To derive an overall index of structure for this category set, we divided within-category similarity by between-category similarity to find the structural ratio (Homa et al., 1979; ). Exemplars shared 2.4 traits within category (including self-similarity) and 1.6 traits across categories. Thus, the structural ratio for this category set was moderately low-1.5. This low index of category differentiation correctly reflected that the individual features were only about 70% diagnostic, that exemplars were nearly as similar across categories (sharing 1.6 traits) as within categories (sharing only 1.9 traits if one excludes self-identities), and that three of the nine items were ambiguous because they shared traits equally with both prototypes.
However, these categories still were linearly separable (LS). Formally, linear separability means that the two categories in a set can be separated by a linear discriminant function. Conceptually, this means that a simple, additive evidence rule can correctly classify all the exemplars in a category set. The categories of Experiment 1 are LS if attention is deployed adaptively (i.e., by attending to Dimensions 1, 2, and 4 and by ignoring Dimension 3). The focus on LS categories is common in research featuring binary-trait stimuli (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1992) because LS categories have a natural family-resemblance structure, and because both prototype and exemplar models can predict the correct classification of all the category members in an LS category set, thus allowing for a fair comparison between the models. Prototype models can sometimes describe nonlinearly separable data well, when participants make errors on the exceptional stimuli (Smith & Minda, 1998) .
Dimensional configurations. Each experiment used four different prototype pairs that were defined by randomly chosen polarity configurations of the binary stimulus features (i.e., with 0 and 1 corresponding to short and long legs for some participants, but corresponding to long and short legs for other participants). To avoid any correspondence between one particular physical feature and one logical dimension, the task's physical features were mapped to the logical dimensions shown in Table 2 in four ways (body, head, legs, eyes; eyes, body, head, legs; legs, eyes, body, head; head, legs, eyes, body) .
Procedure. Participants were assigned randomly to one of the four polarity configurations and one of the four dimensional rotations. The bug stimuli were presented in 40 blocks of nine trials (360 trials), with each block a random permutation of all the training stimuli in the experiment. Trials were presented in an unbroken fashion that did not emphasize these blocks.
The stimuli were presented on an 11.5-in. diagonal computer screen on a white background. Each trial consisted of a drawing of the bug that appeared slightly to the left of the center of the screen. Slightly to the right, the large numerals 1 and 2 appeared on the screen to remind participants how to respond. Participants had unlimited time to respond. A correct classification was followed by a brief, computer-generated whooping sound, and an incorrect classification was followed by a 1-s low buzzing sound. Along the top edge of the screen, the participant's score was displayed. The score card was incremented by one point for a correct classification and decremented by one point for an incorrect classification. As soon as a response was made and the appropriate feedback given, the bug disappeared and the next stimulus was presented. A similarity-rating phase followed the learning phase of the experiment. There were 90 possible pairs (starting with 1-1, 1-2, etc., then 2-1, 2-2, etc.). Since each nonidentity pair was presented twice (1-2 and 2-1), we included two of each identity pair in the set of 90 (1-1 and 1-1). Each of the 90 pairs was shown four times in four randomly ordered permutations (360 trials). Participants were asked to rate the two bugs for how similar or different they were on a 1 (no difference) to 6 (big difference) scale. Participants received no feedback during this phase of the experiment. 1 A questionnaire phase followed the similarity-rating phase of the experiment. As part of this questionnaire, participants rated the importance of each of the features in determining their classifications.
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Formal Models and Procedures for Fitting Data
This section examines the processing assumptions and parameters of all models considered. The primary contrast is between balanced prototype and exemplar models that differ only in their underlying representational assumption. The inclusion of the additive prototype model anchors the present research to much of the original research that used the 5/4 category structure. This section also describes the procedures used for fitting models to data.
The multiplicative exemplar model. According to most exemplar models, participants store a trace of every member of a category. A to-be-categorized item is compared with all of the stored exemplars of both categories in a task, and categorization is a function of which group of stored traces the item is most like, and how much it is like them. In addition, most exemplar models assume that people can selectively attend to some features of stimuli and not to others when making these comparisons. They also assume that the similarity between item and exemplar is an exponentially decaying function of the psychological distance between them.
In evaluating the exemplar model, we focus on the context model originated by Medin and Schaffer (1978) and generalized by Nosofsky (1986) . In the context model, the to-be-categorized item is compared with all the A exemplars (including itself if it is an A) and to all the B exemplars (including itself if it is a B), giving the overall similarity of the item to Category A exemplars and Category B exemplars. The comparison of each item to all the exemplars in the task is crucial for the exemplar model to predict better performance on A2 than on A1. Dividing overall A similarity by the sum of overall A and B similarity yields the probability of a Category A response.
The similarity between the to-be-categorized item and any exemplar is calculated as follows. The values (1 or 0) of the item and the exemplar are compared along the four stimulus dimensions. Matching features contribute 0.0 to the overall psychological distance between the stimuli; mismatching features contribute to overall psychological distance in accordance with the attentional weight their dimension carries. Each attentional weight varies between 0.0 and 1.0 and attentional weights are constrained to sum to 1.0 across dimensions. The raw psychological distance between item and exemplar is scaled using a sensitivity parameter that varies from 0.0 to 20.0. Larger values essentially magnify psychological space, increasing the differentiation among stimuli, increasing overall performance, and increasing the value the exemplar model places on exact identity between the item and exemplar. Formally, the scaled psychological distance between the to-becategorized item i and exemplar j is given by Equation 1:
(1)
Here x ik and x jk are the values of the item and exemplar on dimension k, w k is the attentional weight granted dimension k, and c is the sensitivity parameter. This distance is converted to the similarity between an item and an exemplar, as shown in Equation 2:
These steps are repeated to calculate the psychological similarity between a to-be-categorized item and each A and B exemplar. Summing across the Category A exemplars and Category B exemplars gives the total similarity of the item to Category A members and Category B members. The probability of a Category A response for stimulus i is given by Equation 3:
The multiplicative prototype model. Prototype models generally assume that people abstract and store the prototype of categories. A to-be-categorized item is compared with the prototypes in a task, and categorization is a function of which prototype the item is most like. Most prototype models also assume that people can selectively attend to some features and not to others when comparing the item to the prototype. They also assume that the similarity between the item and the prototype is an exponentially decaying function of the psychological distance between them.
1 The intent of this similarity-rating phase was to provide a model-free description of attention in the 5/4 task. However, our analyses suggested that in the present case, category learning did not restructure psychological space in a way that was reflected in the multidimensional scaling (MDS) solutions. Rather, we found that participants weighted all four dimensions equally in the perceptual, pair-comparison task. Accordingly, these scaling solutions are not discussed further.
Should category learning affect multidimensional perceptual space and MDS solutions? The literature is mixed on this point. Homa et al. (1979) did show that category learning caused psychological space to come to reflect the category sets that were being learned. However, Shin and Nosofsky (1992) found that the same MDS solution for a group of dot patterns served as well for describing similarity-rating data both before and after category learning. A further consideration in the present case is that the dimensions we used were highly separable. Our chances of changing perceptual space through category learning may have been even less than if we had relied on the complex and obscure dimensions that underlie dot-pattern space.
2 The intent of the feature ratings in the questionnaire phase was also to provide a stand-alone description of attention. However, these ratings held little information. The average ratings for the four dimensions in Experiment 1 were (on a 1-5 scale): 3.25 for Dimension 1, 3.19 for Dimension 2, 2.94 for Dimension 3, and 3.75 for Dimension 4. Participants barely showed the tendency that Dimension 3 was the least influential in their classification decisions and seemed mainly to just hug the middle of the rating scale. This is understandable after 360 categorization trials and 360 similarity-rating trials. These feature ratings are not discussed further.
Specifically, we focus here on the multiplicative prototype model first used by Nosofsky (1987 Nosofsky ( , 1992 . Nosofsky used this model because it allowed for a balanced comparison with the multiplicative exemplar model. Like the exemplar model, this prototype model allows psychological similarity to decrease exponentially with increasing distance between stimuli and has a sensitivity parameter for capturing performance improvements during learning. But now these features are incorporated into a prototypebased model so that the to-be-categorized item is compared only with the A and B prototypes to yield the similarity of the item to Category A and Category B.
The similarity between the to-be-categorized item and a prototype is calculated much as described for the exemplar model. The values of the item and the prototype are compared along all stimulus dimensions. Matching features contribute 0.0 to overall psychological distance; mismatching features contribute to overall psychological distance the attentional weight their dimension carries. The raw psychological distance is scaled using a sensitivity parameter that varies from 0.0 to 20.0. Formally, the scaled psychological distance between the to-be-categorized item i and the prototype P is given by Equation 4:
Here, x ik and P k are the values of the to-be-categorized item and the prototype on dimension k, w k is the attentional weight granted dimension k, and c is the freely estimated sensitivity parameter. Higher values of the sensitivity parameter magnify the psychological space and increase the differentiation between the prototypes within this psychological space and the steepness of the similarity gradient around them. This equation is nearly identical to the equivalent distance equation given for the exemplar model except that the prototype is the presumed reference/comparison standard for the item. This distance is converted to the similarity between an item and a prototype, as shown in Equation 5:
This equation closely resembles the exemplar model's corresponding equation. The steps above are used to calculate the similarity between a to-be-categorized item and the A and B prototypes. Prototype A similarity is then divided by the sum of Prototype A and Prototype B similarity to generate the model's predicted probability of a Category A response for stimulus i, as shown in Equation 6:
The additive prototype model. The additive prototype model still assumes that categories are represented by their prototypes, that categorizations are based on item-prototype comparisons, and that selective attention to particular features is possible. But the additive prototype model assumes that similarity between item and prototype is a linearly decreasing function of psychological distance.
In using this model, we follow the research of Medin and his colleagues (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Medin & Smith, 1981) .
Formally, each to-be-categorized item is compared with the prototype along all the stimulus dimensions. Thus, the distance between an item and a prototype is calculated, as shown in Equation 7:
In the additive prototype model, similarity is simply taken to be iP ϭ1Ϫd iP , the complement of distance. In a pure additive prototype model, dividing Prototype A similarity by the sum of Prototype A and Prototype B would generate the model's predicted probability of a Category A response. However, in the specific version of the model we use here, an additional guessing parameter g is added. That is, we assume that some proportion of the time g participants guess A or B haphazardly while using additive prototype-based similarity otherwise (see also Medin & Smith, 1981; Smith et al., 1997) . The choice rule for the additive prototype model is shown in Equation 8:
where g ϩ p ϭ 1.0.
Model fitting. To find the best-fitting parameter settings of each model, we chose a single parameter configuration (attentional weights and sensitivity or guessing, depending on the model) and calculated the predicted categorization probabilities for the stimuli in an experiment according to that configuration. The degree of fit between the predicted and observed categorization probabilities was the sum of the squared deviations (SSD) between them. This measure of fit was minimized with a hill-climbing algorithm that made a small adjustment to the provisional best-fitting parameter settings and chose the new settings if they produced a better fit (i.e., a smaller SSD between predicted and observed performance). During each iteration of the algorithm, a parameter and a directional change were chosen at random. These changes were small: gradations of 1/100 for the attentional weights and guessing and 1/200 for the sensitivity parameter. To ensure that local minima were not a problem, this fitting procedure was repeated by choosing four more different parameter configurations and hill climbing from there. The variance among the five fits tended to be zero (or very small), indicating that the minima found were close to global ones.
Analytic strategy. The models were fit to the data of each participant at each of several stages of learning. To do so, we divided the experiment into four trial segments. Each trial segment contained 90 trials-10 blocks of the nine stimuli. This approach represented a compromise between two goals. Including more observations in each trial segment allows for more stable estimates of performance. Including fewer observations in each trial segment allows for better temporal resolution in evaluating participants' categorization strategies at different stages of learning. The 90-trial segment was our point of balance between these goals.
Results
Performance. Table 3 shows the average proportion correct on each stimulus and the overall average at each trial segment for 15
participants. An ANOVA on the average proportion correct with trial-segment (1-4) as a within-subject factor found a main effect of trial-segment, F(3, 56) ϭ 29.44, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 0.004, confirming that significant learning occurred.
The fits of the additive prototype model and multiplicative exemplar model. The additive prototype model and the multiplicative exemplar model were fit to each trial segment of each participant's data (see also Smith & Minda, 1998) . The average fits for the prototype and exemplar models were .21 and .17, respectively. Figure 4A shows the SSD of the best-fitting predicted performances from the observed performances, averaged across participants at each trial segment. An ANOVA on SSD with trial segment (1-4) and model (prototype and exemplar) as withinsubject factors found no main effect for model, F(1, 14) ϭ 2.57, ns, MSE ϭ 0.019, suggesting that neither model had an overall advantage. There was a significant interaction between trial segment and model, suggesting that the prototype model lost ground relative to the exemplar model through time, F(3, 42) ϭ 3.79, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.010.
The fit of the multiplicative prototype and exemplar models. We also fit the multiplicative prototype model to the data to allow a balanced comparison between the prototype-and exemplarbased representational hypotheses. The prototype model's fit was .14 overall, compared with the exemplar model's fit of .17. Figure  4B shows that the multiplicative prototype model fit the data better than the multiplicative exemplar model did at each stage. An ANOVA on SSD with trial segment (1-4) and model (prototype and exemplar) as within-subject factors found a significant main effect for model, F(1, 56) ϭ 5.20, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.004, indicating that the multiplicative prototype model fit better. No other effects were significant. This result implies that when comparable models are used, prototype theory provides a better psychological description of performance in the 5/4 task than does exemplar theory. This result contrasts with findings in the literature that were based on comparisons between incomparable models or on analyses of aggregate performance profiles. Here, the prototype-based description was quantitatively better at every stage of learning.
The A2 advantage. Table 3 shows proportion correct at each trial segment and shows that participants performed better on Stimulus A2 than on Stimulus A1. Thus, they showed the A2 advantage predicted by the exemplar model. This A2 advantage was .09 overall, but 5 participants showed an overall A2 advantage larger than .10. An ANOVA on proportion correct with trial segment (1-4) and stimulus (A1 and A2) as within-subject factors found a significant effect for stimulus, F(1, 14) ϭ 9.47, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 0.031, confirming that the A2 advantage was present. There was no significant interaction between trial segment and stimulus, F(3, 42) ϭ 0.30, ns, MSE ϭ 0.021, suggesting that the advantage was about the same at each trial segment.
However, this A2 advantage-when viewed in conjunction with the modeling results-places the exemplar and prototype models into tension with each other. Regarding two of the nine stimuli, the A2 advantage over A1 suggests an exemplar process at work. Regarding all nine stimuli, the superior fit of the prototype model over the exemplar model suggests a prototype process at work. This tension requires that the A2 advantage be interpreted cautiously and analyzed carefully. Attentional weight estimates. The occurrence of an A2 advantage produces another tension between prototype and exemplar theory. Figure 5A (dark gray) shows the average attentional weights estimated by the prototype model for the last two trial segments of performance of the 5 participants who showed a strong A2 advantage (greater than 10%). We used the last two trial segments for this analysis because performance was stable, the fits of both models were stable, and because the A2 advantage was strong here. Similar effects were obtained in all four trial segments, and the nonsignificance of the trial segment by stimulus interaction suggests that these results should generalize to early learning data. According to the attentional description offered by the prototype model, these participants focused their attention on Dimensions 2 and 4 and ignored Dimension 3. This is reasonable because the diagnosticities of the individual features are 66%, 77%, 55%, and 77% for Dimensions 1 to 4, respectively. Dimensions 2 and 4 provide important category information. Dimension 3 provides almost no useful category information. By estimating that these participants ignored Dimension 3, the prototype model endorses the idea that participants shape their attention during category learning into configurations that roughly optimize performance (Lamberts, 1995; Nosofsky, 1984 Nosofsky, , 1986 .
The exemplar model provides a different description. Figure 5A (light gray bars) shows the average attentional weights estimated by the exemplar model for the last two trial segments of performance by the same participants. The exemplar model estimated substantial attention for Dimension 3. Moreover, the model estimated homogeneous attention over three dimensions that have widely varying featural diagnosticities (0.55 to 0.77). It estimated, therefore, that participants attended nonoptimally. The exemplar model behaves in this manner because when an A2 advantage does occur, the model can make only a single formal adjustment to reproduce it: it must allocate attention to Dimension 3. This is how it produces the confusing similarity of A1 to B6 and B7 that anchors exemplar theory's account of the A2 advantage (see Table  2 ). The exemplar model must place weight on Dimension 3 to fit the A2 advantage whether or not the attentional description it estimates in the end is psychologically appropriate. As a result, there was also less disagreement between the two models in their attentional description of participants who did not show a large A2 advantage. The exemplar model does not have to weight Dimension 3 if there is no A2 advantage to fit.
This disagreement between the models makes it important to know whether participants allocated substantial attention to Dimension 3 and attended nonoptimally as the exemplar model suggests. These participants may have allocated attention in this way. However, another possibility is that the exemplar model's attentional description is a formal artifice that serves for reproducing the A2 advantage but is not the best psychological description of attentional strategies in the 5/4 task.
To explore this possibility, we correlated participants' nine observed performances with the logical structure shown for each dimension (i.e., each column in Table 2 ). If participants responded "A" whenever a feature took on the typical Category A value, they would show a high "performance-structure" correlation. If they responded "A" or "B" regardless of whether a feature took on the Category A or Category B value, they would show a low performance-structure correlation. By correlating performance with all four stimulus dimensions (i.e., with all four columns in Table 2 ), we created a correlational attentional profile that reflects the relation of observed performance to the stimulus structure. This cor- relational attentional profile can then be compared with the estimated attentional profiles given by the dimensional weights of the two models. Figure 5B shows the correlational attentional profile (black bars) for the 5 participants who showed a strong A2 advantage in Experiment 1. It suggests that these participants may have ignored Dimension 3, focused attention on Dimensions 2 and 4, and attended optimally. The prototype model's weight profile (dark gray bars) reflected this optimal attentional strategy well and accounted for 82% of the variance across the four weights. Figure  5C shows the correlational attentional profile (black bars) for the same participants compared with the weight profile (light gray bars) estimated by the exemplar model. The exemplar model reflected the correlational attentional profile less well because it weighted Dimension 3 too strongly but Dimension 2 not strongly enough. The exemplar model accounted for only 55% of the variance across the four weights.
However, these correlational attentional profiles are only part of a complete analysis and could have several potential shortcomings. First, it is possible that the correlations may not always reflect participants' attentional allocation. Second, it is possible that the correlational analysis is biased toward prototype theory because it treats the four dimensions independently. This independence might also bias the analysis against the configural nature of the exemplar model's assumptions. Accordingly, we conducted an analysis that avoids these problems and grounds these performance-structure correlations in the processing assumptions of each model. In this analysis, we sampled the entire state space of each model. For every one of 5,000 randomly chosen configurations of dimensional weights and sensitivity, we found the nine predicted categorization performances. We then correlated these predicted performances with the binary logical structure shown for each dimension (i.e., each column in Table 2 ). By correlating predicted performance with all four stimulus dimensions, we again provided a correlational attentional profile. But this correlational attentional profile is what one should expect to see, given the particular representational and processing assumptions of a model. By sampling 5,000 times what happens when a weight is given to a dimension by the model, we can know the entire range of performance-structure correlations that the model can ever predict or expect given that weight. By randomly sampling many levels of weights, we can draw the model's whole landscape of possibilities relating performance-structure correlations and the model's weights (see the Appendix for details).
Figures 6A and 6B show that this analysis is equally friendly to and unbiased toward both models for the fairly diagnostic Dimension 1. Each graph shows the entire sweep of one model's expectations regarding the range of correlations possible when different weights are placed on that dimension. Each graph overlays that sweep with the performance-structure correlations shown by all 15 participants at the last two trial segments-each plotted over the estimated dimensional weight given that performance by the model. For both models, higher weights placed on Dimension 1 entail stronger correlations between performance and logical stimulus structure. For both models, participants largely fall along the main sequence of the models' expectations. When either model estimates a .1, .3, or .5 weight, participants show approximately the same correlation between performance and logical stimulus structure that the models predict. Similar results were obtained for Dimensions 2 and 4 -both models accounted for the observed performance-structure correlations. For the prototype model, the situation is the same regarding the crucial, nondiagnostic, Dimension 3 ( Figure 7A ). Again, participants show higher performance-structure correlations as the prototype model estimates higher Dimension 3 weights. More of the weights are estimated near 0.0, in accord with the possibility that participants largely ignored Dimension 3. But the exemplar model seems to fail regarding Dimension 3 ( Figure 7B ). Many of the observed performance-structure correlations lie outside the range of the potential or possible expectations of the model. This analysis is conservative because it grants each model its representational scheme and processes. It grants each model its Figure 6 . Panel A: Performance-structure correlations for the prototype model in Experiment 1. The x-axis represents the weight assigned to Dimension 1 by the prototype model. The y-axis represents the correlation between performance on the nine stimuli and their featural values on Dimension 1. The light gray dots represent a simulation of 5,000 randomly chosen configurations of the model's parameters, and the darker dots correspond to the performance-structure correlations actually observed in Experiment 1, each plotted over the Dimension 1 weight estimated for that performance by the prototype model. Panel B: Performance-structure correlations for the exemplar model plotted as just described.
best fit and its best-fitting weight configuration. It maps the entire range of performance-structure correlations that can result given that weight. And it shows that the exemplar model cannot capture the kinds of performance-structure correlations that participants actually show, whereas the prototype model can. The analysis suggests that the attentional description offered by the exemplar model may be a formal artifice that lets the model redescribe some aspects of performance (e.g., the A2 advantage) even while it misses humans' psychology in the task (e.g., their attentional processes) in a fundamental way. It even suggests that participants' performance with this category set is not in accord with the representations and processes assumed by the exemplar model.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, participants learned categories constructed so that the prototype and exemplar models made qualitatively different predictions about two stimuli. The prediction of the exemplar model-a performance advantage on Stimulus A2 over A1-was supported. Thus, our results support exemplar theory on first inspection. However, a closer inspection of the models' fits and of individual participants' performances shows that these data do not really offer that support.
First, the multiplicative prototype model fit significantly better than the multiplicative exemplar model. This advantage was clear throughout the experiment. These two models are matched in their formal complexity, mathematical power, and free parameters. They differ only in their underlying representational assumption. Thus they are an ideal pair of models for contrasting the prototype and exemplar theory. The overall advantage of the prototype model is an important result because this is the opposite result from what has been reported regarding many other 5/4 data sets. Here, the focus on individual-participant profiles, and on equivalent exemplar and prototype models, is potentially clarifying. The overall advantage of the prototype model is also important because it shows that the A2 advantage is not as closely linked to exemplar theory, or to the superior fit of exemplar models, as has been suggested (e.g., Nosofsky, 1992) . If this superior fit of the prototype model is replicable (see Experiment 2), it suggests rethinking some of the evidence that has seemed to support exemplar theory.
Second, the prototype model was more accurate at estimating the attentional policy of participants than the exemplar model was. The prototype model estimated that even participants with the largest A2 advantages adopted an attentional policy that emphasized Dimensions 2 and 4, excluded Dimension 3, and was close to optimal. The exemplar model estimated that these participants adopted a different attentional policy that focused attention on Dimension 3, focused equal attention on Dimensions 2-4, and was nonoptimal. Our correlational analyses suggested that the prototype model's description of attention in the task was correct, and that the exemplar model's description was incorrect. The modelbased correlations make clear that this was not because some bias in the performance-structure correlations favored the prototype model. Participants did not show performance-structure correlations that were predictable or possible starting with the exemplar model's own assumptions, and granting it its best-fitting description. This suggests that there is some error in that description. Participants-even those who showed a large A2 advantage-are probably not categorizing using the processes assumed by the exemplar model. If they were, their categorization response proportions (and thus their performance-structure correlations) would fall within the allowable space of the exemplar model's predictions. This result, if replicable, casts doubt on the appropriateness of the exemplar model's assumptions with regard to 5/4 data.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 replicated the learning phase of Experiment 1. Again, we asked whether the fits of the models and the aptness of their attentional descriptions would favor a prototype-or an exemplar-based description of category learning. In addition, we added a transfer phase to the task in which participants classified Figure 7 . Panel A: Performance-structure correlations for the prototype model in Experiment 1. The x-axis represents the weight assigned to Dimension 3 by the prototype model. The y-axis represents the correlation between performance on the nine stimuli and their featural values on Dimension 3. The light gray dots represent a simulation of 5,000 randomly chosen configurations of the model's parameters, and the darker dots correspond to the performance-structure correlations actually observed in Experiment 1, each plotted over the Dimension 3 weight estimated for that performance by the prototype model. Panel B: Performance-structure correlations for the exemplar model plotted as just described.
old and new items without feedback. We also asked participants to rate the typicality of these old and new items during the transfer phase. This provided a second way to evaluate the psychological appropriateness of the different attentional descriptions offered by the prototype and exemplar models.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight undergraduates from the State University of New York at Buffalo participated to fulfill a course requirement.
Stimuli and category set. The stimuli were the same line-drawn creatures used in Experiment 1 (Figure 3) . The category set (Table 4 ) was similar to the category set used in Experiment 1, except that now seven transfer items were included in the last phase of the experiment. As in Experiment 1, we used four different polarity configurations and four different assignments of physical features to logical dimensions.
Procedure. Participants were first assigned randomly to one of the four feature-to-dimension mappings and to one of the four feature-polarity configurations. The learning phase was identical in all respects to the learning phase of Experiment 1. After 40 blocks (360 trials), participants entered the transfer phase. In the transfer phase, the stimuli (training exemplars and transfer items) were presented in 8 blocks of 16 trials-each block a random permutation of the 16 stimuli-delivered in the same unbroken fashion. These 128 trials were presented without feedback. After classifying each stimulus, participants then rated the stimulus for its typicality as a member of its category. Participants were instructed to rate each bug on a scale of 1 (the bug was a poor category member) to 6 (the bug was an excellent category member).
Results and Discussion
Performance. Table 3 shows the average proportion correct at each trial segment. An ANOVA on average proportion correct with trial segment as a within-subject factor found a main effect of trial segment confirming that significant learning occurred, F(3, 141) ϭ 43.48, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 0.006. By the final trial segment, participants were .76 correct-almost exactly as in Experiment 1.
The fits of the additive prototype and multiplicative exemplar models. The additive prototype model and the exemplar model were fit to each trial segment of each participant's data. The average fits for the prototype and exemplar model were .21 and .17, respectively. Figure 8A shows the SSDs between the observed and predicted performance averaged across participants at each trial segment. An ANOVA on SSD with trial segment (1-4) and model (prototype and exemplar) as within-subject factors found a main effect for model, suggesting that the exemplar model fit better overall, F(1, 47) ϭ 4.59, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.032. There was also an interaction between trial segment and model, F(3, 141) ϭ 10.78, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 0.010, suggesting that the fit of the prototype model got worse, relative to the fit of the exemplar model throughout the experiment. This essentially replicates the results of Experiment 1, except that now there is a significant main effect for the exemplar model.
The fits of the multiplicative prototype and exemplar models. However, Figure 8B shows that when comparable models were used to fit the individual-participant data, the multiplicative prototype model fit best throughout learning. The prototype model's fit index was .15 overall, compared with the exemplar model's fit index of .17. An ANOVA on SSD with trial segment (1-4) and model (prototype and exemplar) as within-subject factors found a significant main effect for model, F(1, 47) ϭ 5.92, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.007, indicating that the multiplicative prototype model fit best. The interaction between trial segment and model was not significant, F(3, 141) ϭ 1.33, ns, MSE ϭ 0.004. This result of using comparable models, like the identical result in Experiment 1, implies that the prototype model provided a better psychological description of performance than did the exemplar model-even for a category set that has been influential in supporting exemplar theory.
We also fit the transfer data using the multiplicative prototype and exemplar models. The prototype model's fit was .69 and the exemplar model's fit was .68. These were not significantly different, F(1, 47) ϭ 0.10, ns, MSE ϭ 0.160. discussed the inherent fit disadvantages that prototype models face in fitting transfer data. Despite this disadvantage, the prototype model fit the data as well as the exemplar model did.
The A2 advantage. Table 3 shows proportion correct for each stimulus and shows that Experiment 2 produced a performance advantage for Stimulus A2 over A1, though a smaller one than in Experiment 1. An ANOVA with stimulus (A1 and A2) and trial segment (1-4) as within-subject factors found a main effect for stimulus, F(1, 47) ϭ 13.89, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 0.022, confirming this advantage. Thirteen of 48 participants showed A2 advantages larger than 10%. This A2 advantage weakened in the transfer phase, though. There, performance was .84 on A1 and .89 on A2. These were not significantly different from each other, F(1, 47) ϭ 2.65, ns, MSE ϭ 0.018.
Attentional weight estimates. As in Experiment 1, we analyzed the performance and attentional strategies of the 13 participants who showed a strong A2 advantage during the experiment's second half. We examined the dimensional weights estimated by the multiplicative prototype model and the multiplicative exemplar model. We also found the performance-structure correlations for the A2-advantage participants just as we did in Experiment 1. That is, we correlated each participant's observed performance on each of the nine stimuli with the logical values in each column of the stimulus array (the training stimuli in Table 4 ), and we averaged these correlational attentional profiles across the 13 participants with an A2 advantage of 10% or greater. Figure 9A shows this average correlational attentional profile (black bars) compared with the average weight profile (dark gray bars) estimated by the prototype model for the participants who showed strong A2 advantages. As before, participants seemed to ignore Dimension 3 and focus attention on Dimensions 2 and 4. The prototype model reflected this correlational attentional profile reasonably well, although it misdescribed Dimension 1 somewhat. The prototype model accounted for 86% of the variance in the performance-structure correlations. Figure 9B shows the same average correlational attentional profile compared with the weight profile (light gray bars) estimated by the exemplar model for the same participants. The exemplar model reflected the correlational attentional profile less well because it misdescribed Dimension 1 and Dimension 3. The exemplar model accounted for 69% of the variance in the performance structure correlations. Experiment 2 suggested again that participants attended optimally, by ignoring Dimension 3 and focusing attention on Dimensions 2 and 4, and that the prototype model reflected this attentional strategy best.
As in Experiment 1, we took a further step to ensure that these correlational analyses treated both models fairly. We sampled the entire state space of each model in exactly the same way as described for Experiment 1. Thus, we provided a correlational attentional profile that reflected the expected performancestructure correlations given the representational and processing assumptions of a particular model in a particular configuration.
Regarding Dimension 3, the prototype model was again able to accommodate the performance of most of the participants in the experiment ( Figure 10A ). Participants showed higher performance-structure correlations as the prototype model estimated higher Dimension 3 weights, although most of the weights were again estimated near 0.0. But the exemplar model failed again regarding Dimension 3 ( Figure 10B ). Many of the observed performance-structure correlations lay outside the range of the potential or possible expectations of the model. That this result has now appeared twice (in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) raises concerns that the assumptions of the exemplar model are incorrect for describing the performance of participants in these categorization experiments. Transfer performance. We tracked the attentional policy of the same 13 A2 participants into the transfer phase. If they really did attend to Dimensions 2 and 4 while ignoring Dimension 3-as described by the correlation analysis and the prototype modelthen the performance-structure correlations and the prototype model's weights should still converge, and the exemplar model should still mischaracterize Dimension 3's attentional weight. We correlated performance on each stimulus with the logical structure shown in Table 4 , just as we had done for the learning data, except that now we included all 16 transfer stimuli. Figures 11A and  11B -which are very similar to Figures 9A and 9B-suggest that participants did ignore Dimension 3 and that the prototype model's attentional description was superior in the transfer phase of the experiment, too. Thus, the data collected from the end of the learning phase were consistent with the data collected after learning.
The typicality ratings collected in the transfer phase provided another estimate of attention that stood outside the assumptions of either model. As with performance, we correlated the rated typicality of the 16 stimuli with the logical structure in the four stimulus dimensions, to see how strongly typicality ratings correlated with the typical and atypical features found in each dimensional position. These correlation coefficients were .21, .36, Ϫ.01, and .42 for the four dimensions. These typicality-structure correlations, just like the performance-structure correlations, and like the description of the prototype model but not the exemplar model, suggested that participants ignored Dimension 3, and attended optimally. 
Experiment 3-Meta-Analysis
Both Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that the exemplar model provides an implausible description of participants' attention in the 5/4 task, even when participants show a large A2 advantage. To put these results in historical context, we revisited 30 existing 5/4 data sets reported in 8 papers in the literature (Lamberts, 1995; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Medin & Smith, 1981; Medin et al., 1983; Medin et al., 1984; Nosofsky et al., 1992; Nosofsky et al., 1994; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995) to see if the exemplar model had experienced the same descriptive difficulties in previous research (see for a complete examination of these data sets and Nosofsky, 2000 and for additional discussion). Table 1 shows the category structure of Medin and Schaffer (1978) used to collect the 30 data sets. This category set is logically equivalent to the category set used in Experiments 1 and 2 and has the identical distribution of exemplars in categories, the same similarity relationships and structural ratio, and the same LS character. One unimportant difference is that in Experiments 1 and 2 the Category A and B prototypes were the logical stimuli 0 0 0 0 and 1 1 1 1, respectively, whereas in the Medin and Schaffer case the category assignments were reversed. The second unimportant difference is that in Experiments 1 and 2 the four dimensions had featural diagnosticities of .66, .77, .55, and .77, whereas in the Medin and Schaffer case these diagnosticities were exactly reversed (.77, .55, .77, and .66) because the logical dimensions were exactly reversed as well.
Category Structure
For these data sets, participants should allocate most attention to Dimensions 1 and 3, and they should ignore Dimension 2. Here the exemplar model's descriptive difficulties, if they existed historically, should show themselves as an overestimation of participants' attention to Dimension 2, and an underestimation of participants' attention to Dimensions 1 and 3. But remember that here we will necessarily be analyzing and modeling the behavior of whole, aggregated samples, giving the exemplar model an advantage over the prototype model in fitting the observed data.
Data Sets
Appendix A in summarized in detail the important aspects of the 30 data sets reanalyzed here (source, experimental or training condition, stimulus materials, and so forth). Appendix B in summarized the 30 performance profiles. All 30 profiles were reported using Category A response probabilities in the stimulus order of Table 1 (A1 to  T16 ). In the original sources, a variety of reporting techniques and stimulus orders were adopted.
Formal Procedures
Following , we modeled each of the 30 data sets using the additive prototype model and the standard exemplar model as described earlier. We used the additive version of the prototype model to be consistent with the research reported by and many of the original articles from which these data sets were drawn. Both additive and multiplicative prototype models have a similar disadvantage in fitting the aggregate data samples. Analyses done with the multiplicative prototype model yielded comparable results.
Attentional Weight Estimates
We correlated each data set's 16 observed performances with the binary logical structure shown for each dimension (i.e., each column in Table 1 ). If a sample showed high levels of Category A responses when a feature took on the typical Category A value, it would show a high performance-structure correlation. If the sample responded A or B regardless of whether a feature took on the Category A or Category B value, it would show a low performance-structure correlation. Figure 12A shows the correlational attentional profile (black bars) for the six data sets that had A2 performance advantages larger than 10% and suggests that these samples ignored Dimension 2 and focused attention on Dimensions 1 and 3. In short, they attended optimally. Figure 12A also shows that the prototype model (dark gray bars) reflected the samples' attentional processes well. Figure 12B shows that the exemplar model (light gray bars) reflected the samples' attentional processes poorly. It overestimated attention to Dimension 2 and it underestimated attention to Dimensions 1 and 3. It estimated equivalent attention to three dimensions that vary widely in their featural diagnosticities and in their informational value in the task. In short, the exemplar model estimated that participants in these data sets attended nonoptimally. Just as in Experiments 1 and 2, the exemplar model seemed to fit the A2 result by making a formal adjustment that may have caused it to misdescribe humans' real attention and effort in this task.
We also examined the entire state space of each model. For every one of 5,000 randomly chosen configurations of dimensional weights, guessing, and sensitivity, we found the levels of performance predicted by the model for the 16 stimuli, and then we correlated these predicted performances with the binary logical structure shown for each dimension (i.e., each column in Table 1 ). Thus, we provided a correlational attentional profile that reflected the expected performance structure correlations given the representational and process assumptions of a particular model in a particular configuration. Figure 13A shows the entire sweep of the additive prototype model's expectations regarding the range of correlations that can possibly be observed when different weights are placed on Dimension 2. It overlays that sweep with the performance-structure correlations shown by the 30 historical samples, each plotted over the estimated dimensional weight given that performance by the prototype model. Within very tight constraints, the observed performance-structure correlations for Dimension 2 obey the expectation of the additive prototype model given the dimensional weights it estimates. This occurs even though the prototype model has a disadvantage in fitting the aggregate data samples.
But Figure 13B shows that this analysis is unfriendly to an exemplar-based interpretation of the 30 data sets. Even though the exemplar model is more powerful, and the constraints less tight, the data fail to fall within the bounds of what the exemplar model can expect. Indeed, many of the data points lie in a region of performance space that the exemplar model does not reach. Each observation in this scatter plot (i.e., each large black dot) summarizes the performance of a whole sample, not just the performance from a single participant, as in the experiments. This essentially means that the exemplar model is missing the combined results from hundreds of participants.
This failure has important theoretical implications because of the influential status of these 5/4 data sets. This model-based correlational analysis allows the exemplar model its representational scheme, its systematic exemplar-to-exemplar comparison processes, and it maps the entire range of performance-structure correlations that can result given some weight. It shows that the model does not explain the kinds of performance-structure correlations that hundreds of participants actually showed. This suggests, regarding the 30 existing 5/4 data sets, just as it did regarding the individual performances in the experiments, that the attentional description offered by the exemplar model is a formal artifice that lets the model redescribe some aspects of performance, while forcing it to misdescribe humans' psychology in the task. It suggests that participants' performance with this category set is not in accord with the representations and comparison processes assumed by the exemplar model.
General Discussion
There are many reasons why this 5/4 category set, used in this methodology, should produce data that support exemplar theory. First, this small, poorly structured, four-dimensional category set is of the sort that many have argued should most encourage exemplar-memorization processes Reed, 1978; Smith et al., 1997; Smith & Minda, 1998) . Second, the present methodology used highly repetitive training techniques in which the same nine stimuli were repeated 40 times, creating well-individuated exemplar traces that could have easily supported exemplar-based categorizations. Third, this category set is the one that strongly motivated exemplar theory originally and most strongly supported it over the past 2 decades. Finally, our data Figure 13 . Panel A: Performance-structure correlations for the prototype model in Experiment 3. The x-axis represents the weight assigned to Dimension 2 by the prototype model. The y-axis represents the correlation between performance on the 16 stimuli and their featural values on Dimension 2. The light gray dots represent a simulation of 5,000 randomly chosen configurations of the model's parameters, and the darker dots correspond to the performance-structure correlations actually observed in existing 5/4 data sets, each plotted over the Dimension 2 weight estimated for that performance by the prototype model. Panel B: Performancestructure correlations for the exemplar model plotted as just described.
even showed the A2 advantage that is a qualitative prediction of the exemplar model. For these reasons, it is important that the present results fail to support exemplar theory's assumptions about processing and representation in category learning.
One important feature of the results is that the prototype model generally fit the observed data better than the exemplar model did. We compared equivalent models-with the same parameters and power-that differed only in their underlying representational assumption. In both experiments, when this comparison was made, the multiplicative prototype model fit the learning data significantly better than the multiplicative exemplar model (both models fit the transfer data equally well). Two factors lie behind this advantage. We modeled individual-participant performance profiles, not aggregate performance profiles, and we used equivalently powerful prototype and exemplar models. We believe that if comparable models had been fit to individual-participant performance profiles in previous studies, the result may have been the same as the results here.
A second important feature of the results was the disagreement between the attentional descriptions offered by the prototype and exemplar models. The prototype model suggested that participants-even the participants who showed the A2 advantageattended optimally in the task by ignoring Dimension 3 and by focusing attention on Dimensions 2 and 4. In contrast, the exemplar model suggested that the A2 participants attended nonoptimally by attending to Dimension 3 and by attending more homogeneously across Dimensions 2-4. This disagreement is a concern for exemplar theory because the attentional allocation it suggests is implausible. Participants would probably not weight a useless dimension as strongly in their attentional scheme as they would the most informative dimensions. In fact, exemplar theory generally assumes that participants will attend optimally in category tasks of this sort-even in the 5/4 category set (Lamberts, 1995; Nosofsky, 1984 Nosofsky, , 1986 Nosofsky, , 1991 Nosofsky et al., 1994) .
The disagreement is also a concern for exemplar theory because it seems clear from our correlational analyses that, despite the exemplar model's weighting of Dimension 3 for the A2 participants, participants do not behave like they weighted Dimension 3 at all. Their performance-structure correlations do not fit with what they should be, if the model's assumptions and dimensional weights describe what they are doing. Rather, our model-based analyses suggest that in many cases participants' performance falls outside the expectations that are possible given the exemplar model's assumptions.
One possible reason why the exemplar model chooses a nonoptimal description of attention is that weighting Dimension 3 is the only adjustment the exemplar model can make that will allow it to reproduce an A2 advantage. Weight on Dimension 3 differentiates Stimuli A1 (1 0 0 0) and A2 (1 0 1 0) and increases the similarity of A1 to B6 (1 1 0 0) and B7 (1 0 0 1). This way, the model reduces A1's performance but not A2's. The exemplar model has to put emphasis on Dimension 3 to fit the A2 advantage, whether or not that dimensional description is the real psychological situation. In fact, if the dimensional description is wrong, as it seems to be, the exemplar model is caught in a difficult spot. As the A2 advantage becomes stronger (which could be good for the exemplar model), the attention description becomes more wrong (which would be bad for the exemplar model).
Our view is that there is a disconnect between the formal weight parameters and the conceptual role that they were intended to play: estimating participants' attention (Medin & Schaffer, 1978, p. 212; Nosofsky, 1986, p. 41) . Our results suggest that, in the case of 5/4 data, and in particular large A2 advantages, these weights may come to serve the formal process of fitting and not the process of describing psychologically the attentional allocation of the participant. This raises the concern that the exemplar model may fit some data patterns at the expense of providing an appropriate psychological description of performance. This echoes Maddox and Ashby's (1998) concern that the exemplar model has lost its theoretical structure and its ability to make a priori predictions. One should remember that the exemplar model was not even the best-fitting model-an equivalent prototype model fit the data significantly better while preserving an intuitive connection to participants' actual attentional allocations.
Despite the better fit of the prototype model, and its better ability to capture the attentional allocation, the prototype model still cannot produce an A2 advantage. So, we close this article with unanswered questions about the A2 advantage. Research must consider how there can be prototype-like processing in the 5/4 task, and yet occasional A2 advantages. We do not know the answer to this question, but there are several possibilities. First, the absolute size of the A2 advantage is fairly small. Participants get 40 blocks of trials (and so they categorize 40 A1s and 40 A2s). Suppose they were correct on both A1 and A2 on 28 of those 40 trials, leading to 70% correct. If on 2 blocks of the 40 they did something extra that let them get A2 right, but A1 wrong, they would then get 26 correct A1s (65% correct) and 30 correct A2s (75% correct). Thus, even robust A2 advantages can arise from something localized or transient. It does not have to be a constant effect that can only be described by systematic exemplar-toexemplar comparisons.
Second, if participants focus on Dimensions 2 and 4 they will perform fairly well in the task but may need to memorize the category labels for a couple of exceptional stimuli (e.g., B6 and B7). It might be that A1 is somehow entrapped in confusion as part of the secondary processes (nonprototype-based) that handle the resolution of these exception items. This could explain why participants mainly perform in something like a prototype-based way, but can still show A2 advantages.
In short, we think the A2 advantage will turn out to be temporary in time or the result of secondary processes that coexist with the main prototype-based categorization process. These possibilities would explain the prototype model's better fit, the exemplar model's worse fit, the prototype model's better attentional description, and the failure of participants to produce performancestructure correlations that can be predicted by the exemplar model. In contrast, ascribing the A2 advantage to the systematic exemplarto-exemplar comparisons of exemplar theory explains none of these things. We hope that future research will explain the A2 advantage more completely and will then move away from studies that feature this 5/4 category set, because it turns out to be problematic for exemplar theory as well as prototype theory.
